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NOTE AND COMMENT
Nr:cr:ssITY oF VALID CONTRACT To SUPPORT EscRow.-In Foulkes v.
Sengstacken, (Ore. 1917) 163 Pac. 3n, it is said that "A pure escrow presupposes the e.xistence of a valid contract with sufficient parties, a proper
subject matter, and a consideration. There must be an actual contract of
sale on the one side and of purchase on the other, and until there is such
a contract, the instrument executed by the supposed grantor, though in form
a deed, is neither a deed nor an escrow.'' Accordingly it was held that performance of conditions by a grantee: after the grantor had withdrawn the
instrument from the custodian was ineffective to accomplish a conveyance.
In its decision the court follows Da·vis v. Brigham, 56 Ore. 41, 107 Pac. g61,
Ann. Cas. l9I2B 1340, where the same doctrine, though probably not necessary to the decision, was laid down.
There has come to be considerable authority in the way of text-book
statements, dicta by courts, and a few actual decisions, for the above proposi •
tion: 16 CYc. 562; n AM. & ENG. ENCY. LAW, (2nd ed.), 335; I DtVLIN,
Dr:nos, §313; Stanton v. Miller, 58 N. Y.. 192, (1874); Hoig v. Adrian College,
83 Ill. 267, (1876); Nichols v. Opperman, 6 Wash. 618, (1893), (but see
Mamiing v. Foster, 49 Wash. 541, g6 Pac. 233; King v. Upper, 57 \Vash. 130.
106 Pac. 612, u35, 31 L. RA. N. S. 6o6); Fitch v. Bunch, 30 Cal. 2o8, (1866);
Miller v. Sears, 91 Cal. 282,. (1891); Holland v. McCarthy, 16o Pac. !o69,
(1916); Campbell v. Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, (I8i7); Clark v. Campl;~!!, 23 Ut.
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56g, 65 Pac. 496, 54 L. R. A. 5o8, 90 Am. St. Rep. 716, (1901). See also Anderson v. Messenger, 158 Fed. 250, 85 C. C. A. 468, (1907); Brown v. Allbright, no Ark. 394. 161 .S. W. 1036, Ann. Cas. l915J? (1913). This doi:trine
seems to have re~ived the approval of Professor BIGI>LOW, of the University
of Chicago Law School, 26 HARV. L. Rsv. 565.
A very effective and seemingly complete answer to the doctrine of the
principal case has been made by Professor H. T. fuFANY, in 14 CoL. L. Rsv.
389, 399. H~ there says : "The view referred to has no considerations of
policy or convenience in its favor, and its necessary result is considerably to
detract from the practical utility of the doctrine of conditional delivery.
One objection to such a view would seem to lie in the fact that the doctrine
of conditional delivery is not peculiar to conveyances of land, but is recognized also in connection with contracts under seal and also bills and notes.
If there can be no· conditional delivery of a conveyance in the absence of a
contract of sale, that is, a contract to execute a conveyance, it would seem
~ reasonable inference that there can be no conditional delivery of a contract under seal or a promissory note unless there is a contract to execute
such an instrument. There is no more reason for requiring an auxiliary
contract in the one case than in the others. Yet it has never been suggested,
so far as the writer knows, that there can be a conditional delivery of a
contract under seal or a promissory note only when there is a legally valid
contract to execute the contract or note. Another consideration adverse to
the view referred to lies in the fact that, while the doctrine of delivery in
escrow was recognized at least as early as the first half of the fifteenth century
(see Y. B. l3°HEN. IV, 8; Y. B. 8 Hr:N. VI, 26; Y. B. IO Hr:N. VI, 25), a purely executory contract, not under seal, was not then enforceable either in the
common law courts, or, it appears, in chancery. That being the case, the
requirements of an extraneous contract in order to make the delivery in
escrow effective would, in the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries, have necessitated a contract under seal, and it seems hardly probable that snch a delivery
of an obligation or conveyance under seal was always accompanied by another obligation under seal calling for its execution. The subject of delivery in escrow .is treated with considerable fulriess in at least two of the
earlier books (PERKINS, CONVEYANCING, §§138-144; SHEPPARD'S ToucHSTONE,
.SS, 59), and there is not the slightest suggestion in either as to the necessity
of such an auxiliary contract. It is, to say the least, somewhat extraordinary
that an integral element in a doctrine dating from the commencement of the
fifteenth century should have remained to be discovered by a California court
in the latter half of the nineteenth."
An agreement for the sale and conveyance of property, the consummation of the transaction to be postponed until payment of the purchase price
or performance of some condition, is usually worked out in one of two ways :
a binding, enforceable contract calling for the execution of a · proper conveyance is entered into, or the conveyance is prepared at once, fully executed
by the grantor with the exception of a complete delivery, and deposited with
a third party in escrow to be fully operative t:pon the happening of the
event specified. In the first, upon performance by th" vendee and refusal
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by the vendor, an action on the contract, normally, in the case of land, at
least, for specific performance, is the remedy, and in such case it is of course
vitally important that there be shown a binding contract. In the second, title
passes ipso facto upon the performa11ce ·by the purchaser, and the handing of
the deed over to him is for tha purpose unnecessary. It is submitted that
in such cases it is not material. that there is no enforceable agreement, and
to hold, as in the principal case, that such agreement is necessary is to confuse the al)ove two methods of accomplishing such a business transaction.
Nor is such contract necessary to prevent.the grantor from withdrawing his
deed from the depositary, for by hypothesis the deed has been delivered
by the maker to a third party, as to such transaction not the representative of
the grantor, to be delivered to the grantee therein upon the happening of the
event. As to the maker, such deed is a completed legal act. The very
nature of an escrow therefore is such, it is submitted, that so long as the
grantee has still the privilege of performing, the custodian may very properly,
even must, say to the grantor upon demand for tl:].e instrument that he cannot comply.
In Farley v. Palmer, 70 Oh. St. 223, (I870), although the case might well
have been disposed of on another ground, there is a very nice inst~ce of
the working out of the correct doctrine. Palmer and wife had contracted
to sell and convey her land to Farley, and a deed signed, etc., by Palmer
and wife had been executed and deposited in escrow to await the payment
of the purchase price. Upon refusal by Farley to perform, Palmer and
wife sued Farley to compel him to pay the price. He defended on the ground
that since Mrs. Palmer as a married woman was not bound by the contract
he could not be compelled to perform. The court, however, rejected this
contention, holding that Mrs. P'almer had already performed, that she had
no power to revoke the deed, and that upon performance by Farley the title
would have vested in him ipso facto without further delivery.
R W. A.

LIMITATIONS UPON THE UsE, AFTER SALE, OF PATENTED ARTICLES.-ln the
case of Motion Pict11re Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 37 Sup. Ct. 4I6,
the Supreme Court has just rendered a decision which reverses the much
discussed case of Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. I. The opinion was by a
divided court, however, as three of the justices dissented, and Justice McREYNOLDS "concurred in the result" only. It can, therefore, hardly be said
to ·settle the ultimate rule as in contradiction to that followed in Henry v.
Dick Co., and discussion of the case is of something more than mere academic
value.
The facts were that the plaintiff was owner of a patent covering a necessary part of the mechanism on moving picture projecting machines. This
particular device was of such efficiency as to be in general use, to the prac'tical exclusion of all substitutes. The plaintiff granted a license to manufacture and sell these parts, the licensee agreeing that it would not sell them except under agreement with each vendee, for himself and his assigns, that they
should be used only with a certain type of film. This licensee sold a machine
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to an exhibition company which, in tum, transferred it to the defendant, the
Prague Amusement Company. There was no privity -of contract between this
defendant and the plaintiff, but the defendant took the machine with notice
of the restriction. The defendant,. the Universal Film Manufacturing Company, supplied films to the Prague Company for use ·On the machine, having
itself been notified of the restriction. The question raised was whether the
-restriction upon the use of the machine was enforcible against one not a
party to the agreement, but who had notice of it.
The restriction is, in appearance, one upon the full and free enjoyment
of a corporeal chattel, placed there by an erstwhile owner who has parted
with the title. The obvious inquiry is whether limitations upon the perfect
ownership of personal property are enforcible in the. courts.
It may be said at the outset that in this particular respect the Patent
Statute does not affect the inquiry. It provides nothing in respect to the
ownership of property nor its transfer, except in the indirect way to be referred to later. All it does is to create a new form of incorporeal property,
namely, the legal right in a patentee to exclude others from enjoyment of
his invention. The invention itself is not corporeal, it is a concept of means
to an end. It is the "ownership" of this concept which the Patent Statute
creates.
Whether restrictions upon the enjoyment of personal property are enforcible at common law is undecided. Negative restrictions upon the complete enjoyme11t of real property may be so created as to be enforcible at
law, or, as in England, in equity, against subsequent owners acquiring the
property with notice. TIFFANY, REAL PRoP., §349· The reason given by
one court, (Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen 341, 83 Am. Dec. 632), is simply
that "restrictions and limitations which may be put on property by means
of such stipulations, derive .their validity from the right which every owner
of the fee has to dispose of his estate, either absolµtely or by a qualified
grant, or to regulate the manner in which it shall be used and occupied."
Restrictions as to the 'type of use of real estate are common. Blakemore v.
Stanley, 159 Mass. 6; Keening v. Ayling, 126 Mass. 494.
The fundamental reason for allowing them is of course merely one of
public policy, and its expression, as formulated by the court quoted from,
applies to personal property as pertinently as it does to real estate. But
that it does not in fact extend to personal property is indicated in occasional
dicta. A writer in 28 LAW QUARTERLY REVIE\V., 73, says, "In the case of
chattels generally, any restFiction as to their use can only be imposed by
means of a contractual relation between a vendor and his purchaser, and
will extend no further than the contractual relation extends." He cites no
authority, however, and the present writer can find none except in resp'ect
to restrictions upon the re-sale price. Although these particular restrictions
ar'! held unenforcible, that does not necessarily indicate a difference between
other- restrictions on personalty and those on realty, because restrictio~s upon
the alienation of real property are also held in disfavor by the courts. GRAY,
R£STRAINTS o~ ALIENATION. In some of the cases holding price restrictions unenforcible there are intimations tliat all restrictions come under the
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same ·rule. Thus the court in John D. Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed.
24, 39, in passing µpon the validity of a system of contracts restricting re-sale
price., says, "It is also a general rule of the common law that a contract
restricting the use or controlling sub-sales can not be annexed to a chattel
so as to follow the article and obligate the sub-purchaser by operation of
notice. A covenant which. may be valid and run with land will not run
with or attach itself to a mere, chattel." See also, Taddy v. Sterious, [1904],
l Ch. Div., 354; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373A few other cases indicate, by analogy, a difference in respect to restrictions
upon realty and personalty in holding that although express warranties run
with the ownership of the former they do not follow that of the latter. Smith
v. Williams, n7 Ga. 782; Prater v. Campbell, IIO Ky. 23.
This uncertain state of the common law certainly permits a decision that
restrictions upon its use can not be made to follow the ownership of a
chaftel. The decision in the Motion Picture Patents case is therefore perfectly sound, if one considers the restriction in that case as one sought to be
imposed by the plaintiff upon the use of the projecting machine.
But was this restriction, after all, created by the plaintiff or any other
owner of the chattel? Did the plaintiff not, rather, release, to a limited
extent, a restriction upon the defendant's use ·of the chattel, which was
actually imposed by the Patent Statute? Ownership of a chattel, however
untrammelled by agreement it may be, does not ipso facto connote and carry
with it an unrestricted right to use the chattel. By virtue of the Patent
Statute, the owner is precluded from using it at all, if its use happens to
constitute enjoyment of a patented invention. Even though the· owner may
have created the chattel himself, he is absolutely restrained from its use under
such circumstances. The patentee of an invention may refuse permission tQ
any or all owners of chattels, which embody his invention, to use them, however their ownership :tnay have been come by. Continental Paper Bag Co.
v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405.
The writer can think of no reason why, if a patentee in his own discretion
can forbid or permit l1-n owner to use his property, be may not grant a
modified permission, and limit the extent of the authorized use. It is at least
the logical postulate that if the right to use, regardless of ownership, depends
upon permission, wholly at the patentee's discretion, be may grant the right
of use to such greater or less exent as his discretion dictates. When a
patentee 'himself sells a tangible thing embodying his invention, the presumption is that he gives with it all the usual rights of ownership unrestricted by his
own patent monopoly. But when in selling the thing he delimits the right
of user by express stipulation, there is no room for any such presumption.
This has been the holding of practically all the cases prior to the principal
one, although it must be confessed that reisons given have not always been
either definite or consistent. The courts have upheld limitations which allowed invasion of the monopoly in a specified respect only (Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully, 144 U. S. 248), or for sp!!cified purposes only (Gamewell Firealarm Telegraph Co. v. Brooklyn, 14 Fed. 255), or which gave the right to
use a particular machine on condition that no other machines of the same
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kind be used (United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202), or to use the device
only at the licensee's place of business' (R11bber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788),
.or to use on condition that the product of the device should not be sold
below a certain price (Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70), or to
use for a limited time only (Mitcl7ell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544). Permission
to use only with certain films, seems to be an absolute analogy. It ·has been
held, also, that one who voluntarily or othernrise pays full damages for
having unauthorizedly made, used or sold a chattel embodying a patented invention does not thereby acquire any right to continued use or enjoyment
of the chattel, nor is his vendee thereof in any better position. Birdsell v.
Shaliol, n2 U. S. 485. And this is despite the fact that the one so precluded
from enjoyment is in all other respects the "owner" of the particular thing.
These restrictions have been enforced as though they were unreleased
restrictions of the patent law, and not as limitations original)y imposed by
one individual upon another. This is the ground on which the decision was
expressly based, in the English case of Incandescent Gas Light Co. v. Cantelo,
12 R~p. Pat. Cas. 262. "The patentee,'' said that court, "has the sole right of
using and selling the articles, and he may prevent anybody from dealing with
them at all. Inasmuch as he has the right to prevent people from using them
or dealing in them at all, he has the right to do the lesser thing, that is to
say, to impose his own conditions." In accord are, British M'litoscope & Biograph Co. v. Homer, [1901], l Ch. Div. 671; National Phonograph Co. v.
Menck, [19n], A. C. 336. All of this authority is completely in accord with
the holding of Henry v. Dick Co., which cites still other precedents.
When one recognizes the restriction of use in the Motion Picture Patents
case for what it really is, namely, a limited release of a statutory restriction~
and is not misled by its mere form of expression, the decision in the case is
-learly in conflict with both logic and precedent. The court admits itself to
ave been influenced by a feeling that the restriction, if sustained, "would be
ravely injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more a
avorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes." The fault
owever, if any, _is with the Patent Statute which imposed the restriction,
:i:ather than with.the patentee who relieved the public, at least to some extent,
from its rigorous and absolute prohibitions.
J. B. W.

DUl! PRoc:tss OF LAw AND TR:£ R:i;cm.ATION OF HoURs 01.t LABoR.-§2 of
Chapter 102, Oregon Laws of 1913, provides: "No person shall be employed
}n any mill, factory, or manufacturing establishment in this State more than
. ten hours in any one day, except watchmen and employes when engaged in
making necessary repairs, or in cases of emergency, where life or property
.is in immiment danger; provided, however, employes may work overtime
not to exceed three hours in any one day, conditioned that payment be made
for such overtime at the rate of time and one-half of the regular wage." The
plaintiff in error was found guilty of causing one of his employes to work
for thirteen hours in 011-e day, the employe not being within the excepted
conditions and not being _paid the rate prescribed for overtime. The United
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States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the statute is
consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment. Bunting v. Orego>i, 37 Sup.
Ct. 435.
The plaintiff in error's conviction had been upheld by the Supreme Court
-0f Oregon. Bunting v. Oregon, 71 Ore. 259. The appeal raised two questions: "(I) Is the law a wage law, or an hour of service law? And (2) if
the latter, has it equality of operation?" The contention of plaintiff in error
was that this was a law regulating wages, the argument being as follows:
The employer is prohibited from working the employe more than thirteen
hours a day, and thus in respect to thirteen hours it may be said to be a
regulation of the hours of labor; but where the employe works more than
ten hours a day, the employer must pay him at the rate of one and a half
times the market price for such overtime. The wrong complained of is the
failure of plaintiff in error to pay for such overtime at the increased rate
pro~ided for by statute; if the conviction of plaintiff iti error is affirmed, it
win result in compelling employers to pay one and one-half times the market
rate for labor above ten hours per day. The majority of the court, however,
considered that the· statement in §1 of the statute, to the effect that the
purpose was to guard the health of the laborer, must be respected. The explanation of the state cpurt as to the higher rate of compensation for overtime was adopted: "Apparently the provisions permitting labor for the overtime on express conditions were made in order to facilitate the enforcement
of the law, and in the nature of a mild penalty for employing one not more
than three hours overtime." Therefore, the court did not find it necessary
to determine what its decision would be if it had been of the opinion that
this was in fact a regulation of wages. The opinion in the Adamson Law
case OVilson v. New, 37 Sup. Ct. 298), is not referred to, nor are such
leading cases as Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 .Sup. Ct.
383; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, ~9 L. ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 3
Ann. Cas. II33; Muller v. Oregon, 2o8 U. S. 412, 52 L. ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct.
324, 13 Ann. Cas. 957. This failure to cite cases, however, is in line with the
realization that each case involving the regulation of labor must be decided
on facts and figures, not on theories and precedents. Each case is a new
problem. Yet it is evident that the court is no longer willing to stand by
its opinion in the Lochner case, where the prohibition was against employment in bakeries for more than ten hours a ·day. A new modus operandi
for determining the constitutionality of such statutes has been adopted. No
longer is the question of whether or not the trade is so unhealthy as to
necessitate the regulation of its hours weighed in the scale of "common
understanding'' as in the Lochner case;·but, beginning witli Muller v. Oregon,
counsel have seen the wisdom of furnishing the court with scientific data
and opinions by experts upon the question as to the proper number of working hours in various industries. Mr. Louis D. BRANDEIS in the preparation
of the Muller case made a radical step in the art of advocacy when he refrained from citing numerous decided cases as precedents for his contentions,
but rather quoted from the reports of over ninety committees, bureaus of
statistics, commissioners of hygiene, etc., to the effect that long hours were
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injurious to the health of employes. The decisions in those cases argued orr
this basis speak loudly for tlie effectiveness and wisdom of this method of
advocacy. In People v. Schweinler Press, 2I4 N. Y. 395, 410, Io8 N. E. 639,
overruling Peo(>le v. Williams, I89 N. Y. I3I, 8I N. E. 778, the court states
that when the previous case was decided it did not have the benefit of
scientific data on the subject, and now that it has before it the result of research as to the proper hours for labor, it is prepared to reach an opposite
conclusion from that expressed in the prior case. Is it too much to say that
the Lochner case would have been differently decided had the court been
properly presented with scientific data bearing on the unhealthfulness of more·
than ten hours labor per day in bakeries?
As the court regarded the law as one regulating the hours of service and
not wages, it had no difficulty in disposing of the sernnd ground of appeal,
i. e., that the law violates the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth
amendment in that it makes the employer in a mill, factory, or manufacturing
establisliment pay more for labor than other employers are required to pay.
But the court having reached the determination that the effect of the law
was not to regulate wages, an argument based on that assumption must fall
along with its premise. Regarding the law as a regulation of hours of labor,
there is sufficient basis for the classification adopted by the legislature.
It is worthy to note that the Chief Justice, Justice VAN DEVAN'f:ER and
Justice McREYNOLDS dissented. As no dissenting opinion was published, the
reviewer refrains from attempting to state the exact grounds of their dissent. Justice BRANDEIS, having been interested in the preparation of brief
for the defendant in error, took no part in the consideration or the decision.
The brief filed by the defendant in error is voluminous and exhaustive, apparently all the scientific data and opinion on the question of the disadvantages of long hours of labor having been S!!t forth. See also I8 YAL!~ L.
JOURNAL 454; 29 HARV. L. REV. 353; IS MICHL. REv. 259.
W. L. 0.

THE MATF.RIALMAN'S LIEN AND THE TITLE OF THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY-§47a(2) of the BANKRUPTCY ACT as amended in I9IO, gives the trustee the
rights of lien creditors over property in. the custody of or coming into the
custody of the bankruptcy court, and of judgment creditors holding an
execution duly returned unsatisfied over property not in the court's custody.
Despite this section, the New York Court of Appeals decided in the recent
case of Gates v. Stevens Co11strnction Co., IIS N. E. 22, that a materialman
who had furnished materials to a bankrupt prior to the filing of the petition
and adjudication, and who had filed notice of his lien aiter such adjudication
but within the statutory period is entitled to his lien, and that the trustee in
bankruptcy, in taking title to moneys due to the bankrupt, takes ·title subject
to the materialman's lien.
In New York and in most, if not all, of the states, the materialman, by
filing notice within the statutory time, perfects his equitable lien, which
begins in inchoate form when the first material is furnished. A general
assignee for the benefit of creditors, )laving no greater right than· the assignor
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himself, takes subject to the materialman's lien, filed subsequent to the assignment but within the statutory period. Jolm P. Kane Co. v. Kill11ey, 174 N.
Y. 6g, 66 N. E. 619. The trustee in bankruptcy, prior to the 1910 amendment of §47a(2), had no greater rights under §70, as against the materialman, to money due the bankrupt, than. had the bankrupt himself. Crane Co.
v. Pneumatic Signal Co., 94 App. Div. 53, 56, 87 N. Y. Supp. 917, 919; York
Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344-. The materialman's lien is not obtained
through legal proceedlngs, and hence· cannot be set aside by the trustee
under §67f. REMINGTON, (2nd Ed.), §u55.
The court in the instant case assumes in its decision that the money
payable to the bankrupt and subject to the materialman's lien was not in
the actual custody of the bankruptcy court, but that there was a mere right
to recover the money, and-following the majority decision in Hildreth
Granite Co. v. City of Watervliet, 16! App. Div. 420, 146 N. Y. Supp. 495that this right is not intended to be covered by ·the first provision of the
amendment of §47a (2), but comes explicitly within the second provision,
under which the trustee has only such a claim as is possessed by a creditor
with execution returned unsatisfied, namely, a right by the commencement
of an action to establish an· equitable lien.
In York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, supra, decided in l9o6, it was held that a
vendor under a conditional contract of sale, which under the Ohio law was
void as against creditors and purchasers in good faith because not filed; but
good as between the parties thereto, could hold the property ·against a trustee
in bankruptcy, as the latter was in no better position than the bankrupt at
the tiine of adjudicatiop. The primary intentio"n of the 1910 amendment of
§47a(2) was to do away with the effect of this decision by enabling the
trustee to avoid secret and unrecorded liens.
The question involved in the instant case is whether the amendment exceeds the primary intent, and gives the trustee a lien which will prevail over
that of the materifllman, which at the time of adjudication had not been
perfected. Two of the five judges in the Hildreth Granite Co. case, supra,
dissented on the ground that the words "all property in the custody of or
coming into the custody of the bankruptcy court" l>re not limited to property
which has been brought into the actual physical possession of the trustee,
By the adjudication all the property of every name and nature representing
a money value goes to the t,rustee, who is a mere officer or instrument of
the court, and such property is in the custody of the court, "at least so far
as it is within the jurisdiction of the court and not in the custody of some
other court,'; and hence that the trustee, before the materialman's lien was
filed, had a creditor's lien within the meaning of the first provision of §47a(2)"
and should prevail over the materialman, whose lien was not filed till after
adjudication.
The judge ,..;ho delivered the majority opinion in the Hildreth Granite Co.
case cites no authority and gives no argument in support of his position, but
cpntents himself with an expression of his belie~. The dissenting opinion,
in addition to the argument just preceding, relies on the statement from
Ha1to11er Natio11a.l Bank v: Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, .191, that an "adjudication

588

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

follows as a matter of course, and brings .the bankrupt's property into the
·custody of the court for distribution among his creditors." Both the argument and authority relied on in the dissenting opinion seem sound, putting
a debt on the same footing as property brought into the actual physical
possession of the trustee, that is, it brings them within the operation of the
1irst provision of §47a(2).
§67 of the original act subrogated the trustee to a lien in fact acquired .
by the creditor by legal or equitable proceedings within the four months'
period. The class· of cases, unprovided for by the original. act, and intended
to be reached by the 1910 amendment, was that in which no creditors had
acquired liens by legal or equitable proceedings, and to vest in the trustee,
for the interest of the creditors, the potential right of creditors with· such
liens. In re Bazemore, i8g Fed. 236, 26 A. B. R. 494; In re Calhoun Supply
Co., 189 Fed. 537, 26 A. B. R. 529. Chapter 33, §5, of the Consolidated
I.ilws of New York (1909), the statute governing the principal case, gives to
those furnishing state or· municipal corporations with labor or materials for
public improvements a lien upon the "moneys of the state or such corporations
applicable to the construction of such improvement."
°If it be assumed that the dissenting opinion in the Hildreth Granite Co.
ease is correct and that debts are on the same footing as tangible property
in the trustee's physical possession, the ·question then arises whether the
creqitor's lien possessed by the trustee should prevail over the materialman's
lien perfected· after adjudication. Had the lien been perfected prior to the
accrual of the "trustee~s lien, even though within the four months' period,
it would have come within the exception o! clause (d) of §10, which provides
that "liens given or accepted in good faith and not in contemplation of or in
fraud of this act, and for a present consideration, which have been recorded
according to law if recording thereof is necessary in order to impart notice,
shall not be affected by this act." Moreau Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 29 N. D.
n3, 150 N. W. 563; lli?MINGToN, §u55.
But even though a creditor's lien is superior to the materialman's unperfected lien, every reason exists for protecting the latter where the lien is
not filed till after adjudication-if within the statutory period-as well as
where it is filed before adjudication. The theory is tha~ the newness of the
work gives notice for ninety days, after which recording is necessary as a
reminder of the rights of the materialman. In the language of the majority
opinion in Hildreth Granite Co. v. Watervliet, a contrary interpretation "would
require a materialman, in order to protect his rights, to :file a new lien immediately after each load of material furnished, lest the contractor might file a
petition in bankruptcy and .defeat his rights."
S. D. F.

